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Notes
Problems of Advance Land Acquisition
I. INTRODUCTION
The cost of property acquired for public use is often greatly
increased by the construction of improvements after it has been
determined that the land will be needed for a future public
use.' In addition, construction of relatively short-lived im-
provements on such land constitutes economic waste. Some
commentators and many state governments 2 are presently seek-
ing an efficient method whereby public authorities may acquire
or reserve the land at the time that the contemplated pub-
lic use is first planned,3 rather than when the property is ac-
tually needed.4 The prime advantage of advance acquisition or
reservation is the limitation or prevention of improvements on
land which is known to be needed for a future public purpose.
Several other benefits of advance acquisition have been sug-
gested: (1) more orderly development of communities can be
achieved; (2) more orderly, deliberate, and beneficial relocation
of businesses, farms, and persons can be achieved at lower so-
cial and economic costs; (3) with more lead time due to advance
acquisition, public improvements can be better planned; (4) pri-
vate developers and property owners can plan their land uses
in a manner consistent with public use plans; and (5) relations
between the public and the condemning authority will be im-
1. Two contrasting examples illustrate the problem: In one in-
stance, the Alabama Highway Department saved several million dollars
by purchasing a large undeveloped shopping center site near Birming-
ham in 1959, though the land was not needed for highway purposes
until 1967. STAFF OF HOUSE PUBLIC WORKS COMM., 90TH CONG., 1ST
SEss., ADVANCE ACQUISITION OF HIGHWAY RIGHTS-OF-WAY STUDY 2 (Comm.
Print 1967) [hereinafter cited as Committee Report No. 8].
In Minnesota, a ready-mix cement plant was expanded and auto-
mated because the State could not definitely establish how much of
the property was needed and funds were not available to condemn
in advance, increasing the cost by $500,000. Id. at 67.
2. D. MANDELHER. & G. WAITE, A STUDY OF FUTURE ACQUISITION AND
RESERVATION OF HIGHWAY RIGHTS-OF-WAY (1963); Address by Arthur A.
Davis, Director of Land and Facilities Development Administration,
Department of Housing and Urban Development, in San Francisco,
July 28, 1967; Committee Report No. 8.
3. Twenty-six states and Puerto Rico have varying statutory
schemes, most of them recent, designed to permit some form of advance
acquisition for future highways. The usual technique is to allow
present condemnation for future use. Committee Report No. 8, at 3.
4. See note 48 infra and accompanying text.
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proved with more time to negotiate with landowners.5
However, a system of advance acquisition or reservation
has many problems. The constitutional limitations on state po-
lice power and the power of eminent domain are significant
barriers. In addition, state ownership of lands acquired in ad-
vance creates difficult administrative problems: The state must
prevent deterioration of the property in a manner detrimental
to the neighborhood and must face a variety of management and
landlord-tenant problems in maintaining the property during the
period between acquisition and actual public use. Also, local
fiscal problems6 can be created by withdrawing substantial
amounts of property from the tax rolls for extended periods
of time.
The following discussion will examine the major methods of
advance land acquisition and reservation and the legal and prac-
tical problems involved in each, and will suggest alternative
techniques of less-than-fee acquisition for accomplishing the
goals of advance acquisition while avoiding the major disadvan-
tages of the present methods.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 7 OF EMINENT DOMAIN
A. NECESSARY PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT
The acquisition of land for future use under the power of
eminent domain can be accomplished only where the land is
necessary for a public use." The question of whether the pro-
posed use is "public" arises when property acquired for a future
public use is leased to a private person for private use during
the interim period. In City and County of Honolulu v. Bishop
Trust Company,9 the city leased a building situated on land
which had been acquired through eminent domain for future use
5. Committee Report No. 8, at 2.
6. In some instances, statutes provide that property tax can be
assessed against a lessee where the property is publicly owned. In
states having such a taxing system, taking property off the tax rolls
would be much less significant, though the problem would still exist if
the property remained unused in state hands. See, e.g., CAL. REV. &
TAX. CoDE § 107.1 (West 1956).
7. The Constitution provides that no one shall be deprived of
property without due process of Law, U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, and that
just compensation must be paid for private property taken for public
use. Id. amend. XIV, § 1. Nearly all state constitutions have similar
provisions.
8. See Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707
(1923).
9. 49 Hawaii 494, 421 P.2d 300 (1966).
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as a public park. The court held that the rental of the building
to a private person was a temporary and necessary exercise of
due diligence in maintaining the property until the public use
could be accomplished.10 However, it is not clear whether a lease
to a private individual over a long interim period would be ap-
proved even if the ultimate use was public. One possible resolu-
tion of this question is suggested in a related area. The term
"public use" has been deemed a flexible term which may in-
clude the sale of condemned property to private persons for pri-
vate development pursuant to an area redevelopment plan.1
The United States Supreme Court endorsed this view in Berman
v. Parker,2 by approving a similar redevelopment plan. The
Court stated that once it is shown that the object of a program
is a legitimate goal, Congress is free to determine the appropri-
ate means to attain that goal.' 3 Moreover, while some courts
have construed public use narrowly, 4 the modern view is that
the Constitution requires only that a "public benefit" must re-
sult from the taking. 5 With such a flexible interpretation of the
term, a taking of property for a future public use or purpose
would apparently meet the requirement even if the property
were leased to private persons.
B. IMMVINENCE OF PUBLIC USE
1. Reasonable Time
Closely related to the existence of a public necessity for
the advance taking is the question of the maximum time period
permissible for advance acquisition. This has not been clearly
defined by the courts or statutes. For highway purposes, fed-
eral funds are available as part of each state's annual appor-
10. Id. at 501, 421 P.2d at 304. See Heger v. City of St. Louis,
323 Mo. 1031, 20 S.W.2d 665 (1929), where it was held on similar facts
that the city could rent, to private persons, houses on property ac-
quired for future use as a park but only for such time as may be reason-
ably necessary to convert the property to legitimate purposes. Id. at
1038, 20 S.W.2d at 670.
11. Housing & Redevelopment Authority v. Greenman, 255 Minn.
396, 96 N.W.2d 673 (1959).
12. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
13. Id. at 33.
14. See, e.g., Shasta Power Co. v. Walker, 149 F. 568 (N.D. Cal.
1906); City & County of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal. 2d 52, 279 P.2d 529
(1955).
15. See, e.g., Frustuck v. City of Fairfax, 212 Cal. App. 2d 345, 28
Cal. Rptr. 357 (1963); Dairyland Power Co-operative v. Brennan, 248
Minn. 556, 82 N.W.2d 56 (1957); 2 J. SACKMAN, NIcHoLs' THE LAw or
EMMsxT Doimnm §§ 7.1-.627 (3d ed. 1963).
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tionment from Federal Highway Trust Funds for advance ac-
quisition as much as seven years before construction.'0 While
this federal rule provides a guideline for advance acquisition,
apparently only one state17 defines a maximum time in its ad-
vance acquisition statutes.
It is often unnecessary for the state to show exactly when
the property will be put to public use. In State v. Chang,8
the court allowed the state to acquire land for use as part of a
state office building complex even though the state was un-
able to show exactly how and when the land would be used for
this purpose. A similar result was reached in Carlor Com-
pany v. Miami,19 where the plaintiff argued that it was beyond
the power of the city to take land for use as a municipal air-
port and hold it for over seven years without taking any action
to use the land. The court rejected this argument, stating that
it is the duty of public officials to plan for the future.20 The
court pointed out that while the airport facilities were presently
adequate, it was probable that the plaintiff's land would be
needed for expansion of the facilities.21
However, state courts have not allowed every anticipation of
future needs. In Board of Education v. Baczewski,22 the Board
sought to condemn defendant's land for the erection of a high
school which the Board admitted might not be built for thirty
years or more. The Board intended to use the land for a
playground until the school was built, but it made no claim
that the land was sought for playground purposes. The Board
also admitted that its motive in seeking the land was to save
money. The court held that there was no necessity for the tak-
ing, stating that the necessity requirement ". . . does not mean
an indefinite, remote or speculative future necessity, but means
a necessity now existing or to exist in the near future."23  The
16. Committee Report No. 8, at 3; 23 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1964).
17. Virginia provides for acquisition twelve years in advance of
construction where interstate highways are involved and ten years for
others. This, of course, creates financing problems where construction
does not begin within seven years, since federal funds may be lost.
6 VA. CoDu ANx. §§ 33-57 to -57.1 (Supp. 1966).
18. 46 Hawaii 279, 378 P.2d 882 (1933).
19. 62 So. 2d 897 (Fla.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 821 (1953).
20. Id. at 902.
21. "The hands of public officials should not be tied to the immedi-
ate necessities of the present but they should be permitted, within rea-
sonable limitations, to contemplate and plan for the future." Id. at 903.
22. 340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W.2d 810 (1954).
23. Id. at 269, 65 N.W.2d at 811. Accord, Porter v. City of Charles-
ton, 65 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.W.. Va. 1946); Kern County Union High
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court reasoned that if necessity can be extended to a remote
time in the future, damages should also be extended.24 It then
concluded that such extensions would not only exceed the state's
power of condemnation, but would result in confusion and chaos
in condemnation proceedings because of the impossibility of pres-
ently determining the remote value.25
Other courts have held that judicial interference on the issue
of when property should be taken by the state will be allowed
only where bad faith, fraud, or a gross abuse of discretion ex-
ists.26 The court in Baczewski did not find bad faith, fraud, or
abuse of discretion, but rather applied a "reasonable time"
criterion which seems justified as an additional basis for judi-
cial interference in this area. However, a "reasonable time"
should not be defined in terms of a specific number of years,
since the feasibility of planning for the distant future varies
with each type of public need.27
2. Specific Advance Plans
The question of whether the court will require the state
to have specific plans for the contemplated use at the time of
the eminent domain proceeding is closely related to the ques-
tion of whether a taking is for a "speculative use at some remote
time in the future."28
School Dist. v. McDonald, 180 Cal. 7, 179 P. 180 (1919); City of Duluth
v. Duluth St. Ry., 179 Minn. 548, 229 N.W. 883 (1930).
24. The court's holding that a speculative need at an undefined
time in the distant future does not satisfy the necessity requirement is
sound. However, its suggestion that damages should be determined
with reference to the time that the property is put to public use rather
than at the time of the taking is wholly unjustified. The property
owner suffers a loss on the day of the taking, not when the property
is actually put to public use.
25. A similar result was reached in State v. 0.62033 Acres of Land
in Christiana Hundred, 49 Del. 90, 110 A.2d 1 (Super. Ct. 1954), where
the court held that the state could not condemn a small strip of land
for widening of a highway "within the next three decades."
26. See, e.g., cases cited note 23 supra.
27. Thus, although courts generally agree that future needs may be
taken into account, it is not clear how far in advance property may be
taken. For example in State Rds. Comm'n v. Franklin, 201 Md. 549,
95 A.2d 99 (1953), a state statute provided that no expressway was to be
built to serve less than 5,000 cars per day. The court found that it was
necessary to acquire land for an expressway even though the current
traffic volume was less than 5,000 cars per day since future needs could
be anticipated. Id. at 555, 95 A.2d at 102.
28. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. In State v. 0.62033
Acres of Land in Christiana Hundred, 49 Del. 90, 110 A.2d 1 (Super. Ct.
1954), the court did not deal directly with the question of how specific
1968] 1179
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In Port of Everett v. Everett Improvement Company,29 the
court held that where the Port Authority had no plan, map, de-
tailed description, or specification of the work to be done in
improving a port, it could not acquire land under eminent
domain.30 Although Everett does not define the degree to which
plans must have progressed before a taking will be allowed,
it does indicate that at least a minimal amount of planning
must be shown.3 1
In some situations, however, it is not necessary for the
state to have plans and specifications prepared and funds avail-
able before it can decide that property is necessary for a pub-
lic use. In Carlor Company v. Miami,32 the Florida Supreme
Court approved a taking for airport facilities even though at
the time of the taking, the city was unable to allocate funds and
formulate plans for the project. The court stated that "[ilt is not
necessary that a political subdivision of the state have money on
hand, plans and specifications prepared and all other prepara-
tions necessary for immediate construction before it can deter-
mine the necessity for taking private property for a public pur-
pose."33
The Carlor case was followed in a more extreme situation
in State Road Department v. Southerland, Incorporated,34 where
the state sought to acquire a parcel of land for highway pur-
poses before the defendant could build a planned project of
twenty-eight houses on the land. Reversing a lower court, the
court held that there was adequate public necessity or purpose
for the taking even though at the time of condemnation the state
planned no public use of the land for at least two years, had
no funds allocated for the road, no fixed construction date, no
way of determining such date, no engineering plans, and no
drawing to show the manner in which the road would affect the
the state's plans must be, but it did point out that the applicable state
statute gave the highway department power to condemn land for "pro-
posed" highways only. Consequently, since the contemplated widening
of the road had not yet reached the "proposed" stage, the condemnation
proceeding was not authorized. Id. at 99-100, 110 A.2d at 7.
29. 124 Wash. 486, 214 P. 1064 (1923).
30. The court stated that to condemn land, "... the commission
must adopt and have approved at least a general outline plan of the
improvement it intends to construct." Id. at 493, 214 P. at 1066.
31. This minimal planning requirement may be helpful in assuring
a court that abandonment of public projects after the necessary land has
been acquired is unlikely. See part IV infra.
32. 62 So. 2d 897 (Fla.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 821 (1953).
33. Id. at 902.
34. 117 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1960).
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property. The court noted that the planning and actual con-
struction of highways is limited by financial considerations, and
expressed the view that a lack of funds in any given year
should not hinder the acquisition of land which will be necessary
in the future. The court reasoned that advance acquisition would
in the long run benefit the landowner as well as the public
since he could plan the use and development of the remainder
of his land in a manner consistent with the future public use.35
It would seem that since the landowner will be unable to
prevent the ultimate taking of his land, he certainly will be bet-
ter able to use the land advantageously if he knows how it will
be affected. However, if he would be able to use the land profit-
ably during the interim period without substantially increasing
the cost of public acquisition, he should be allowed to do so.
C. INFRINGEMENT ON USE OF PROPERTY
In addition to the limits respecting the necessary public
use and the imminence of public use, there is a third major
consideration involved in advance acquisition plans. Courts
frequently demand that just compensation be paid for infringe-
ments on the use of private property occurring between the
decision to condemn for future use and the actual condemna-
tion proceedings.
In State ex rel. Willey v. Griggs,3 6 the court limited the per-
missible scope of advance acquisition statutes by holding un-
constitutional a state statute which valued the property taken
under the power of eminent domain at the date on which the
highway department established the necessity for acquiring the
property, and which denied any subsequent damages for transac-
tions or improvements made thereafter.3 7  In so holding, the
court stated that an infringement on the use of property which
diminishes its value in whole or in part is a loss for which com-
pensation must be paid and, in its view, the statute had the
effect of diminishing the value of a landowner's property.3s The
court pointed out that from the date of the resolution authoriz-
ing the taking, the landowner acts at his peril with respect to
the land because, if the state does finally condemn the land (and
there is no guarantee to the owner that it will), no transaction,
appreciation, or improvement enhancing the property's value
35. Id. at 516-17.
36. 89 Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960).
37. Id. at 72, 358 P. 175; ARuz. REv. STAT. -ANx. § 18-155(D) (1964).
38. 89 Ariz. at 74-75, 358 P.2d at 175.
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after the date of the resolution can be included in the award
of compensation. 9 Thus, once the resolution comes into effect,
the uses to which the owner may put the land are greatly limited;
chances of selling or leasing the land are reduced or eliminated
and improvements are effectively prohibited. The court there-
fore decided that the value of the property must be determined
as of the time of the eminent domain proceedings, not from the
resolution date.
The Griggs rationale was followed in Dong v. State,40 where
a landowner brought suit to have his property valued from the
date of the resolution rather than from the date of the con-
demnation proceedings. For reasons not connected with the
condemnation resolution or proceedings, plaintiff abandoned his
house during the period between the date of the resolution and
the date of the proceedings and suffered a decrease in value
because of vandalism. The court held that since the damage was
not caused by state interference with property rights, and since
the state had no control over the p:operty until the condemna-
tion proceedings, the proclamation date could not be the valua-
tion date.
Dong illustrates one difficulty which would arise if a statute
39. The Griggs problem might be partially overcome by the crea-
tion of a fund to compensate the owner for infringements on his prop-
erty uses if the actual condemnation fails to materialize. In Keystone
Associates v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185
(1966), the plaintiff owned the New York Metropolitan Opera House and
wished to demolish it in order to build a new structure. Due to public
interest in preserving the building, the state legislature passed an Act
creating a private corporation with authority to acquire the building
under the power of eminent domain if it could solicit sufficient funds.
The Act also provided that New York City could refuse to grant a
demolition permit to plaintiff for a period of 180 days upon a deposit
of $200,000 to cover any loss which the delay might cause if no con-
demnation ultimately took place. The court stated that since this was
clearly a condemnation statute, the question is to what extent, pending
the exercise of the condemnation power, the state can interfere with the
rights of property owners to build upon or improve their property.
The court further stated that "[t]he deprivation here, not being inci-
dental to a lawful exercise of the police power, is ... unreasonable and
constitutes a taking of property for which just compensation must be
paid... ." The court consequently held the statute unconstitutional on
the ground that $200,000 was not a sufficient amount to insure payment
of all losses which might be caused by the 180 day delay if no condem-
nation occurred. The court concluded that when the state interferes
with property rights in this manner it must provide a sure and certain
fund for recovery of the resulting damage and that the amount of that
fund must be established through the judicial process, not by the
legislature.
40. 90 Ariz. 148, 367 P.2d 202 (1961).
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like that in the Griggs case were upheld: the state would have
to suffer losses due to such factors as neglect, fire, and vandal-
ism which arise during the interim period between the resolu-
tion date and actual possession by the state, a period during
which the state would be unable to control the property. More-
over, since the property owner would receive no benefit from
diligent maintenance of the property during that period, it is
likely that losses due to such causes would be higher than
necessary. Here, as in other areas of the law, the party in con-
trol of the property should bear such risks.
III. POLICE POWER RESTRICTIONS
A. SETBACKS
Compensation is not required for losses caused by a valid
police power restriction which regulates the manner in which
property may be used. While this rule is well settled, its appli-
cation is often made difficult by problems which arise in dis-
tinguishing "regulation of use" from "a taking for public use."
"Setback"41 statutes raise the problem of deciding when an
exercise of a police power becomes a taking for which compen-
sation must be paid. In nearly all cases 42 setback lines have been
held to be a valid regulation under the police power promoting
health, safety, and welfare for which no compensation is re-
quired. For example, in State v. Houghton,43 the court held
that a setback statute was not a "taking" under the guise of the
police power. The court noted that while the public may bene-
fit from a setback statute at the expense of certain landowners,
the lack of a setback requirement would merely shift the loss to
other individual landowners as well as the public.44 Here there
was ample police power justification for the statute without
reference to any possible future acquisition of the property
for public use.
However, at least one Canadian court has held that if the
sole purpose of a setback restriction is to prevent construction
of any structure on the property pending its condemnation for
use as a street, the restriction should be treated as part of
41. A "setback" statute normally establishes a zone measured from
a street or property line within which no building can be constructed.
42. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); McCavic v. De-
Luca, 233 Minn. 372, 46 N.W.2d 873 (1951); State v. Houghton, 171 Minn.
231, 213 N.W. 907 (1927).
43. 171 Minn. 231, 213 N.W. 907 (1927).
44. Id. at 236, 213 N.W. at 909.
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the condemnation proceedings so that a fair measure of com-
pensation may be reached.45 While there appears to be no au-
thority in the United States which sanctions a collateral attack
on the validity of a setback statute as applied to the land
sought to be condemned, 46 the argument that setback laws cannot
be used solely to reduce the cost of acquiring land for public
use seems sound. The court must decide whether the desire
to freeze or depress the value of the land for future public ac-
quisition was the sole purpose of the ordinance or statute, since
such a law should not be held invalid merely because it has
the coincidental effect of reducing public acquisition costs, if its
original purpose was a valid exercise of the police power.47
B. O~ ciAL MAP
The use of an "official map" statute to reduce costs of future
acquisition was approved in limited circumstances in State ex
rel. Miller v. Manders.4 8 There, the statute provided that after
establishing an official map which showed the locations of pro-
posed public improvements, a city would not have to pay com-
pensation for any improvement constructed within the mapped
area unless a building permit had been granted for the struc-
ture. The statute gave authority to the zoning board to grant
exceptions which would increase the cost of public acquisition
"as little as practicable," where the land was not producing a
fair return.49 It expressly prohibited the issuance of a variance
where the landowner would not be substantially damaged by
locating his building outside the :mapped area.50 The court
construed the statute to mean that it is the duty of the zoning
board to grant a variance where substantial damage to the
landowners would otherwise result.,51 While expressly leaving
45. In re Gibson, 28 Ont. L.R. 20, 11 D.L.R. 529 (1913).
46. See Congressional School of Aeronautics v. State Rds. Comm'n,
218 Md. 236, 248, 146 A.2d 558, 564-65 (1958).
47. In McCavic v. DeLuca, 233 Minn. 372, 46 N.W.2d 873 (1951),
the Minnesota court approved a setback ordinance that had as its pri-
mary purposes such police power interests as greater light and air, but
future street widening was also a purpose.
48. 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957). See also Kucirek &
Beuscher, Wisconsin's Oficial Map Law, .957 Wis. L. REv. 176.
49. 2 Wis. 2d at 371, 86 N.W.2d at 473.
50. Id. at 370, 86 N.W.2d at 472.
51. Id. at 372-73, 86 N.W.2d at 473. The court's decision in Manders
leaves the state with no method of preventing construction of costly
improvements where substantial damage can be shown by the land-
owner while leaving the landowner unprotected from a decrease in
the market value of his land where he cannot show substantial damage.
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open the possibility that a specific application of the statute
might be invalid, the court upheld the statute as applied, stating
that there was no legislative attempt to depress land values,
and that the landowner was protected from substantial damage
by the variance procedure.52
The rationale that official map statutes are unconstitutional
as a taking for public use without just compensation has been
recognized in some jurisdictions.5 3 In Forster v. Scott,54 the New
York court held invalid a statute which denied compensation
for any structure built within any area designated as necessary
for future public use by the filing of an official map or plan.55
The scope of this holding was modified in a later case where
the court upheld a statute which provided that no building per-
mit would be issued for the construction of any structure within
the areas designated for future public use on the official map.56
The court held that the landowner had the burden of proving
that he suffered actual damages from the city's refusal to grant
a building permit and that, moreover, the statute did not deny
compensation for structures built after the map was filed, but
It has been suggested that the first of these two problems could be
solved by allowing the landowner to bring an inverse condemnation
action when he can show that his land is substantially damaged by the
official map restrictions. But the landowner who cannot show sub-
stantial damages is not helped by the right to sue in inverse condem-
nation. D. MANDELHER & G. WAiTE, supra note 2, at 130.
52. 2 Wis. 2d at 376, 86 N.W.2d at 475. "Substantial damage" to
the developer could mean requiring greater reservations than the need
generated by the subdivider for additional public services, or a nearly
total deprivation of use, or merely freezing a large portion of the land.
Compare Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442
(1965), with Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893), and Head-
ley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936).
53. The statute considered in Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189,
82 A.2d 34 (1951), provided that no compensation would be paid for
"any building or improvements of any kind which may be placed or
constructed upon or within the lines of any located park or playground,
after the same shall have been located or ordained by council." Id. at
191, 82 A.2d at 35. The statute further provided that this section would
have no effect if the council did not acquire the land within three years,
but it provided no compensation for the loss caused by the three-year
restriction on land use. The court held the statute unconstitutional,
declaring that the "tying-up" of the land was ". . .a taking of property
by possibility, contingency, blockade and subterfuge," in violation of thejust compensation requirement. Id. at 194, 82 A.2d at 37.
54. 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893).
55. The Act put no limit on the length of time that the city could
restrict the use of land in this way, nor did it make any provision for
compensation to the landowner if no condemnation finally occurred.
56. Headiey v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936).
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merely prohibited their construction. 57 However, the court re-
fused to consider the central question of whether building per-
mits can constitutionally be restricted for the purpose of protect-
ing city plans when property values are decreased by such
restrictions.58
The issue was considered in Kirschke v. City of Houston,5 9
where the city refused to grant plaintiff a building permit
because it appeared that the city would need the land for public
use in the future. Since the city refused to purchase the prop-
erty at the time the permit was denied, the plaintiff argued
that the denial was a taking of the property and its beneficial
use. The court dismissed the suit, holding that the landowners
could proceed with the building and enjoin the city from inter-
fering but they could not recover damages from the city be-
cause there was no taking. This is exactly the result which
an intelligent advance acquisition system should prevent, since
it leads to the necessity for subsequent removal of improve-
ments, at great cost to the state and little or no benefit to the
landowner.
C. ZONING AS A SuBsTITUTE FOR EmiNENT DoMAIN
The use of zoning ordinances to decrease the cost of future
land acquisition has generally met with judicial disapproval.
In City of Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex,60 the city re-
zoned plaintiff's land, restricting its use to school or park pur-
poses, thus making it impossible for plaintiff to continue using
his land as he had in the past, or to sell it to anyone except the
city. The court held the zoning restriction invalid on the
ground that the use of the zoning power to depress the value of
property which the city may want to acquire under the power of
eminent domain at a future time was unreasonable and could
not be sanctioned.61
57. This somewhat confusing result might be partially explained
by the fact that the court felt that an adequate building could be con-
structed on plaintiff's land without encroaching on the area reserved by
the city map. The court failed to clarify whether compensation would
be paid for a building constructed without a building permit. How-
ever, this would be anomolous. See generally C. HAAR, LAND USE PLAN-
NING 495 (1959).
58. 272 N.Y. at 209, 5 N.E.2d at 203.
59. 330 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
60. 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (:961).
61. Defendant applied the zoning restriction to plaintiff's land after
defendant's $100,000 offer to purchase the land had been rejected by
plaintiff.
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Although courts will not allow zoning to be used solely to
depress the value of property to be condemned in the future,6 2
the zoning restriction will be considered valid if there is any
reasonable basis for the restriction, even where it appears that
the zoning authority was motivated primarily by a desire to re-
duce the cost of future land acquisition for public use. For ex-
ample, in Congressional School of Aeronautics v. State Roads
Commission,63 the property owner appealed from an award
made in an eminent domain proceeding brought by defendant,
alleging that the value of the land had been depressed by an
improper zoning restriction which was intended solely to lower
the cost of acquiring land for widening the highway. Plain-
tiff's land was zoned for residential use along a 100-foot wide
strip abutting the road. Next to this strip was a 200-foot wide
strip zoned for commercial use; the remainder of the landowner's
property was zoned light industrial. Even though one of the
state's witnesses testified that the strip zoned for residential
use "was reserved for road widening," the court refused to grant
plaintiff's request for an instruction that if the zoning authority
had restricted the zoning of the land to residential use in order
to lower the cost of acquiring it for highway purposes, the
jury should disregard the restrictive zoning.64 However, the
court did not rule out the possibility of granting such an in-
struction under a different application of the same system. 5 The
direct question of the validity of a zoning classification which
was made or retained in order to hold down the cost of future
condemnation for public use was avoided.66
In Sunny Slope Water Company v. City of Pasadena,67 the
court stated that the purpose or motive of city officials in pass-
ing a zoning ordinance is not relevant to an inquiry into the
reasonableness of the ordinance. The court reasoned that if
conditions justify the ordinance, the motives prompting its en-
actment are unimportant. If conditions do not justify the enact-
62. See, e.g., Chase v. City of Glen Cove, 41 Misc. 2d 889, 246
N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
63. 218 Md. 236, 146 A.2d 558 (1958).
64. Plaintiff cited In re Gibson, 28 Ont. L.R. 20, 11 D.L.R. 529(1913), in support of this request. The facts showed that the land value
was cut in half by the residential zoning restriction. 218 Md. at 241,
146 A.2d at 561.
65. 218 Md. at 244-45, 146 A.2d at 562-63.
66. While it is not clear how the court avoided this question, con-
siderable importance was attached to the fact that the school had not
protested the zoning plan until the condemnation proceeding arose,
though the land had been zoned in that manner for several years.
67. 1 Cal. 2d 87, 33 P.2d 672 (1934).
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ment, no inquiry as to motive is necessary.68 While this general
statement reflects sound judicial policy, it may open the door for
an informal program of depressing land values to reduce emi-
nent domain costs any time a condition to justify the ordinance
can be shown. If, for example, the "justifying condition" had
existed for twenty years, the court should not allow the mu-
nicipality to enact an ordinance based on that condition immedi-
ately prior to the eminent domain proceedings. To do so would
be to allow the municipality to evade its responsibility to pay
just compensation through an abuse of its police power.
IV. EFFECT OF AB.ANDONMENT
The consequence of the state's intention to condemn when
followed by an abandonment of plans to acquire certain prop-
erty is another major problem raised by acquisition of property
in advance of public use. The problem was raised in an inverse
condemnation action, Hilltop Properties, Inc. v. State,69 where
the State Department of Public Works informed plaintiff that
two strips of its land would be needed in the future for
highway widening purposes. The plaintiff then developed its
land in a manner consistent with the state's plans and, as a
result, the two strips of land were of little value for any pur-
pose except highway widening. When the state cancelled its
plans to widen the highway, the plaintiff argued that there had
been a "taking for public use" when the land was withheld from
the development of the larger tract at the instance and request
of the state, pending negotiations for acquisition of the land.
After pointing out that a mere plotting or planning in anticipa-
tion of improvement is not a taking, the court stated:
In exceptional circumstances, however, as where a city does
some unequivocal act evidencing an intention to open a proposed
street, parkway, or other contemplated improvement, or where
the prohibitory provisions of an ordinance or statute are such
as actually to interfere with an owner's use of his property, it
is held that the acts amount to a taking in the constitutional
sense.
70
To illustrate the type of "exceptional circumstances" necessary
68. Id. at 99, 33 P.2d at 677. Of course, if the zoning ordinance
renders the land useless, it is invalid without regard to whether a
condemnation proceeding is pending. See City of Plainfield v. Borough
of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (1961); Vernon Park
Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
69. 233 Cal. App. 2d 349, 43 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1965).
70. Id. at 356, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 609, quoting 18 Am. JuR. Eminent
Domain § 144 (1938).
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for recovery, the court cited In re Philadelphia Parkway71
where it was held that property owners had to be compensated
for losses suffered when development of their property was effec-
tively "frozen" while they waited for the city to condemn their
property for a parkway which was already under construction
by the city.72 Philadelphia Parkway established the rule that
where there is an "unequivocal act" evidencing an intention to
put the land to public use, compensation is required. However,
where the public authority merely declares that a landowner's
property will be condemned for public use without initiating
eminent domain proceedings or making progress in the improve-
ment itself, no compensation to the landowner is required.73
In applying this rule to the Hilltop case, the court held that
the request by the state to withhold two strips of land from
development did not constitute an unequivocal act sufficient
to make compensation necessary. But the court did allow plain-
tiff to recover damages on the basis of promissory estoppel.7 4
The court in Hilltop relied heavily on Hamer v. State High-
way Commission75 in reaching its decision that there was no
taking which required compensation. In that case, plaintiff
had started to develop his land as a subdivision when he was
informed by state highway officials that a portion of his property
would soon be taken for highway purposes and any improve-
ments constructed on the land would be lost to him. Plaintiff
revised his development on the basis of this information, and
entered into negotiations with the state which resulted in an
offer by the state to purchase the tract. 'While the plaintiff
was considering the offer, the state withdrew it because the
highway location had been changed. Holding that there was no
cause of action on these facts, the court stated that the plain-
tiff's interest in and permissible use of the land had in no way
been changed and, since any changes made by plaintiff were en-
tirely voluntary-"although possibly ill advised under the re-
71. 250 Pa. 257, 95 A. 429 (1915).
72. 233 Cal. App. 2d at 356-57, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10.
73. Id. at 356, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 609. See generally Annot., 64 A.L.R.
546 (1929).
74. In Silva v. City & County of San Francisco, 87 Cal. App. 2d
784, 198 P.2d 78 (1948), where the defendant had declared that certain
tracts of land, including plaintiff's property, "be secured from their
respective owners by purchase, and condemnation actions when neces-
sary" for a public park, the court held that there had been no taking
of the property since no progress had been made in the contemplated
improvement, and no compensation was required.
75. 304 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1957).
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sulting circumstances"'t 6-there could be no compensation re-
quirement. 7
The extreme degree of uncertainty to which a landowner can
be subjected without protection is shown by Whyte v. City of
Kansas78 Four months after plaintiff had begun construction
of a building flush with the front of his lot abutting a city
street, the city enacted an ordinance authorizing the taking of
a strip of land for road widening purposes. Following the in-
structions of the assistant city engineer, plaintiff tore down
the partially completed building and moved it back four feet.
After the city abandoned its plan to widen the street, plaintiff
brought suit to recover damages. The court denied recovery,
stating that there had been no constitutional taking or damaging
and that the city could have proceeded much farther in the
process of condemnation than mere passage of the ordinance
and still not have been liable in damages.
Commenting on this case, the Hamer court stated that one
who "voluntarily acts" in the expectation that his property will
be condemned "does so at the risk of losing his investment if
the public agency exercises its unquestioned right to abandon
the project or move it to a different location."79 The court failed
to analyze the "voluntary" nature of the act. Since it would
have been expensive to the plaintiff to stop work on a partially
constructed building for an indefinite time, the only alternatives
were to move the structure or to continue with it until condemna-
tion proceedings were begun. Surely this wasteful result should
be avoided. While the state cannot be expected to compensate
those who act in reliance upon announced condemnation plans
without contacting the condemning authority, it should be held
responsible for the landowner's reliance damages where the
landowner acts at the request of the state's agents. The coop-
erative landowner should not be forced to look to an uncertain
tort recovery, while one who improves his property despite a
request to refrain from doing so is compensated if condemnation
does occur,80 and left unaffected by an abandonment.
76. Id. at 874.
77. See State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Beck, 333 Mo. 1118, 63
S.W.2d 814 (1933), where the court suggested that if damages are caused
by the institution and pendency of condemnation proceedings, they must
be recovered in a tort action. In Hamer, the negotiations never reached
the condemnation stage.
78. 22 Mo. App. 409 (1886).
79. 304 S.W.2d at 874.
80. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Fenix, 311 S.W.2d 61
(Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
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The rule that a landowner cannot rely on the state's in-
tention to condemn his land can lead to speculation by investors
who hope to gain financially from expected condemnation pro-
ceedings. In State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Fenix,81
the state attempted to show that the defendants had purchased
a tract of land and build a motel with full knowledge that it
was soon to be condemned. The court held that it was prejudi-
cial error to admit testimony on the issue of whether the de-
fendants knew of the proposed condemnation prior to the time
that they purchased and improved the property since, even if
they did have such knowledge, they were not precluded from
making the best use of their property. The court reasoned that
since the state had established in Hamer8 2 that it may not be
penalized as a result of its advance disclosure of plans to con-
demn property, it ". . . may not, now that the boot is on the
other foot, penalize the landowner by reason of such advance
disclosure."8 3 Since the landowner will not be compensated for
relying upon the expected condemnation to his detriment, but
will be compensated for any improvement he constructs to the
state's detriment, he will be encouraged to ignore any request
by the state to refrain from improving the property. Thus, un-
der the Fenix rationale, it appears that the state must choose
between the alternatives of being liable for losses when aban-
donment occurs or being unable to prevent construction of costly
improvements.
In addition to the problems raised by a landowner's actions
taken in reliance upon state condemnation plans, damage may be
caused by state condemnation plans even where the landowner
takes no action at all. Compensation is not required for inci-
dental losses caused by the pendency of condemnation proceed-
ings where condemnation does occur8 4 or where the condemna-
81. Id. at 61.
82. 304 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1957).
83. 311 S.W.2d at 64. See 4 J. SACKMAI, NicHoLs' THE LAW or
EMIn-NT Dom I §§ 13-14 (3d ed. 1962).
84. For example, in State v. Vaughan, 319 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958), the defendant owned a building from which he derived
income by renting to tenants. When it became known that the building
was going to be condemned, the tenants began moving out. The court
held that the resulting loss in income was an incidental damage for
which no compensation was required.
Similarly, in Town of Swampscott v. Remis, 350 Mass. 523, 215
N.E.2d 777 (1966), the court held that the failure of a statute to pro-
vide compensation for the period between the adoption of the order of
intention to take and the entry of judgment of condemnation did not
make it unconstitutional.
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tion plans are abandoned and no "unreasonable delay" is in-
volved.85 The factor of unreasonable delay becomes more acute
with advance acquisition since long periods of time are neces-
sarily involved. Courts might be persuaded to hold that such
damages would have to be compensated if an advance acquisition
statute provides for a long time period between the decision
to condemn and the actual proceeding.
V. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
A. CONDEMNING A NEGATIVE EASEMENT
The ends which current advance reservation and acquisition
methods seek to serve could be better achieved by the con-
demnation of less-than-fee simple interests."6  Such a method
has several advantages, including lower present public invest-
ment costs, greater flexibility in lend use during the period
between present condemnation and future need, and keeping
the land in private hands and on the tax rolls during the period.
At least three new approaches to advance acquisition seem
to merit consideration. Perhaps the least complicated is the
acquisition of a negative easement to forestall development of
the land. Landowners who do not contemplate improving their
land might be willing to negotiate an agreement with the state
to refrain from doing so.87 Where an agreement could not be
reached, the state would be allowed to condemn a negative ease-
ment reserving the land for public use in a manner similar to
official map statutes.88 The compensation to be paid for the
taking of the easement would be based upon the amount by
which the present market value of the land is decreased by the
presence of the easement. This method would compensate the
landowner fully for the interest taken, thus avoiding the argu-
ment that the just compensation requirement was not met.89
85. See Upper Third St. Dev. Corp. v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d
595, 99 N.W.2d 687 (1959).
86. It is clear that the government can condemn a less-than-fee
interest. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
87. It would probably be advantageous to allow the landowner to
make certain improvements, on the condition that no compensation
would be paid for them. This would allow construction of improve-
ments which could be amortized during the period between construc-
tion and the final taking for public use.
88. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
89. The court in State ex rel. Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365,
86 N.W.2d 469 (1957), states in dicta that it would be unconstitu-
tional for the state to deny a variance permitting improvement of land
within a reserved area if an economic hardship could be shown. Id.
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Such a system would also provide fair compensation to land-
owners who now suffer a loss when their land is "reserved"
under an official map statute, but who are unable to show a
sufficient economic hardship to obtain a variance.2 0
Though the power to condemn an easement would be helpful
in some situations, several problems remain. The cost of such
an easement might approach the total value of the land in an
area of intensive land use, thus making it more advantageous
economically to condemn the entire fee. Furthermore, the state
would lose its entire investment in such easements if the pro-
ject were abandoned or relocated, unless the landowner would be
required to repay a portion of the easement price at the time
of an abandonment. 91
Probably the main drawback to a "condemned easement"
system of land reservation is the difficulty of determining what
constitutes "just compensation" at the time of the final taking of
the fee in cases where "development value" is a substantial factor
in the value of the land. Since the easement restriction in effect
takes the development value and since the compensation for the
taking of the easement was paid when the easement was cre-
ated, the court in which the final condemnation is tried will be
faced with the difficult task of appraising the "value" of the
land without including the "development value" of the land. As
a practical matter, the market value of the land will be based
on an estimate of the amount the government would have to
pay in the eminent domain proceeding. Because of this rela-
tionship between the easement restriction and the value of the
remaining fee, just compensation can be accurately computed
only when both values are determined at the same time, es-
pecially in areas of intensive land use. Moreover, if payment for
the easement is not made when the easement rights are taken,
the landowner will be left uncompensated for the period of time
between the taking of the easement and the taking of the fee.
Therefore, both valuations should be made at the time of the
taking of the easement. The valuation problem might be par-
tially solved by placing a time limit on the easement. For in-
at 373, 86 N.W.2d at 473. By condemning an easement on the land,
and compensating the owner for the resulting decrease in value, the
state could often "reserve" the land at a reasonable cost without casting
an uncompensated burden on the landowner.
90. See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
91. This could present practical problems. For example, if the
landowner found a use for the land which did not require new im-
provements, he might be unwilling to pay anything for such de-
velopment rights.
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stance, if the land is needed ten years in the future, a twelve-
year time limit might be placed on the easement. At the time
of the condemnation of the fee, ten years after the easement
had been condemned, only a two-year restrictive easement would
remain. Thus, valuation difficulties would largely diminish,
since the situation would be very similar to that in which there
were no easement restrictions on the land. Also, a more realistic
value could be placed on the easement itself at the time of its
condemnation, since the land is encumbered only for a fixed
period of time.
B. CONDEMNING A REI£AIDER INTEREST
Another method of advance acquisition is the condemnation
of a remainder interest,92 leaving the landowner with a term for
years during the period before the public use. The present
value of the remainder could be determined by subtracting the
value of the term for years from the present market value.
This method is preferable to immediate acquisition of the entire
fee, since it leaves the land in private hands, allowing the pres-
ent owner to use or lease the land until it is needed for public
use. Of course, use of the land will be restricted by the fact
that no compensation would be received for new improvements,
but such restricted use must necessarily be the aim of any sys-
tem of advance acquisition.
However, the taking of a remainder interest is only a par-
tial solution at best. As with any other interest in land, it
would seem that the state would have to compensate the owner
at the time the remainder interest was taken, not at the expira-
tion of the term for years when the land was actually put to
public use. This could necessitate vast expenditures of public
funds several years in advance of the public need. This system
would be only marginally better than a system of acquiring the
entire fee and leasing the property back to the former owner
or another private party.
C. NEGOTIATED OR CONDEMNED OPTIONS
The negotiated or condemned option is a third possible
method for advance land acquisition. The state would negotiate
with the owner for a purchase option on property needed for
future use and pay the landowner the amount by which the
92. Cf. Davis, supra note 2.
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option decreases the present value of his property.93 During
the interim, the owner would be free to use the land as he saw
fit. 4 A major advantage of this arrangement is that the land
would often be used in a more productive manner than if the
state condemned the land ten years ahead of time.
Unfortunately, a negotiated option cannot always be ob-
tained. This problem could be solved by allowing the state to
"condemn an option" when it was unable to reach an agreement
with the landowner to purchase an option.9 5 The "taking" of
the option would be fully compensated at the time that the op-
tion was imposed; no further eminent domain proceedings would
be necessary when the state exercised its option. Since the
landowner would receive full compensation, there should not
be a constitutional objection. Also, as with an option obtained
by agreement with the landowner, the owner could use the
land until it was actually needed for public use, or he could sell
or lease the land subject to the option. 6
Perhaps the prime objection to a "condemned option" sys-
tem is that it would be difficult to determine the value of the
option at the time of the eminent domain proceedings, but it
would not be a great deal more difficult to determine the present
value of an option to purchase property at a fixed price at a
certain time in the future than to determine the actual current
93. For example, if a tract of land is worth $10,000 in 1968, rather
than presently condemning it for $10,000 the government might pur-
chase an option to buy the land for $10,000 in 1978; in an era of rising
land values such an option might decrease the 1968 value by $2,000.
Thus, the state would pay $2,000 in 1968, allowing landowner to stay in
possession until 1978 when the state would exercise its option and buy
the land for $10,000.
94. The landowner would be allowed to improve the land as he
saw fit. While he would receive no compensation for such improve-
ments, he may in some instances decide that he would get an adequate
return on his investment before the option could be exercised.
If the landowner was dissatisfied with the option arrangement, he
would be free to lease or sell the land subject to the government's
option. He could presumably sell his land for its value with the option
present, i.e., $8,000; he would then have $10,000 for his $10,000 tract
of land.
95. Of course, the present cost of the option to the state might
make it more economical to condemn the entire fee simple. In an
analogous area, one federal agency uses the rule of thumb that where the
present cost of a less-than-fee interest reaches 50% of the fee value,
it acquires the full fee. Davis, supra note 2, at 2.
96. Such a system could necessitate modifications in some tax
appraisal systems. Reappraisal of the land after such condemnation
would be necessary to reflect the lowered value to the private owner.
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value. The value of the option with its particular terms 7
would be the amount by which the option would decrease the
current market value of the land on. the day it was imposed.98
A further objection is that this system could cause the state
to speculate on an increase in the rate of land value apprecia-
tion by acquiring options on an excessive amount of land. This
could be at least partially solved by giving each landowner the
choice of agreeing not to improve his property or not to receive
compensation for such improvements rather than allowing the
option to be imposed. The state would then have to acquire
the property under the normal process of eminent domain, but
without compensating for new improvements, at the time the
land was needed. Allowing the landowner to make this choice
would be especially important in areas of relatively stable land
use, since such an agreement may have little or no effect on the
property value. However, under such an agreement, the state
might in fact be forced to pay for an. increase in the land value
caused by the coming of the public improvement, because of
the difficulty of separating this noncompensable increase from
normal appreciation. This result would be avoided where the
state held an option at a fixed price 9
The problem of abandonment of the state's plans to use the
land would be simplified by a condemned option system; the
state could merely sell its option when the abandonment de-
cision was made. It would probably be advantageous to give
the current owner the opportunity to purchase the option at
its current value, but the owner should not be allowed to
97. The condemning authority should be allowed to set the terms
of the option, within reasonable limits, before the condemnation pro-
ceedings. The function of the court would then be to determine the
actual value of the option under those terms. Otherwise, there would
be an infinite number of possible ways of arranging the relative levels
of the eventual purchase price and the current value of the option.
98. The state should be allowed to set the time at which the option
will expire, in order that it could coordinate its acquisition program.
Perhaps the state should be able to set a time period of two years or so
during which it could exercise the option, to allow for minor delays or
accelerations in plans to construct the public improvement. But, the
state should have to give the current owner adequate notice of exactly
when the purchase will occur, to allow him to plan accordingly.
99. The fixed price might be modified somewhat to minimize the
effect of monetary inflation by allowing the price to escalate to counter-
act inflation. For example, if the purchase price were set at $10,000 in
1968 to be paid in 1978, the payment could be based on 1968 dollars;
thus, perhaps $10,400 might actually be paid in 1978. This would pre-
vent an "inflation loss" from being cast on the landowner, and would
add certainty to the process of determining a fair value of the option.
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purchase back the option at the original price since he was
fully compensated for it at the time the state acquired it.
While this would have the effect of giving the state a profit on
land which had increased at a rate faster than that anticipated
when the value of the option was determined, the alternative of
allowing the current owner to repurchase the option at the
lower original price would encourage speculation based on in-
side information where an abandonment was forthcoming. To
allow the original owner to repurchase the option at the
original price would give him a windfall, especially where he
had subsequently sold the land subject to the option and thus
received its full value.
Another advantage of a "condemned option" system is that
the state would not have to advance all the funds for the land
years before it was needed. By keeping the land in private
hands, subject to the option, until it was actually needed for a
public purpose, the state would have a workable system for
avoiding excessive outlays of current capital for future needs
as well as the wasteful expense of paying for improvements
built in an area known to be needed for a future public use.
This would allow the land to be used in the most beneficial
way possible in view of the future public improvement.1 00
The three suggested methods of advance acquisition of less-
than-fee interests are not exclusive of each other. A prime
consideration in weighing the relative merits of each system is
the nature of the land to be acquired. For example, in a stable
farming area, the acquisition of an easement to prohibit new im-
provements would be very inexpensive and would not greatly
complicate valuation problems at the time of the taking of the
fee. Similarly, the taking of a remainder interest would be bene-
ficial in an area of stable use if the state had adequate funds
available for that purpose. The taking of a remainder interest
would allow the state to avoid paying for any increase in the
value of the land during the interim, while still providing fair
compensation to the landowner. On the other hand, in areas of
rapidly changing land use, where the development value of the
land may be a major factor in the total value of the land, the
condemned option system would be most advantageous.
100. The state would also avoid the problems of being a landlord
which would arise if the land was acquired by eminent domain years
in advance of the public need.
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